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IV.—XENOPHON'S OECONOMICUS.¹

In the preface the writer tells us that he does not propose to set forth a complete recension* of the text of the *Oeconomicus*, but to exhibit the dialogue in its original form, divested of those additions which have been foisted into it from early times. He thinks it can be proved that the book as it came from Xenophon has been worked over by some other hand in a very unskillful manner, and that every one who is capable of forming an unprejudiced judgment will agree with him.

Herr Lincke's mode of dealing with his author is peculiar. In the forty-six pages of his Greek text there is no indication of an omission anywhere, except that the small marginal figures used to mark chapters and sections do not run on without breaks. Not merely has he removed from their proper places in the text the passages which he deems interpolations, but the longest and most important of these is not even permitted to appear in the book at all. The amount of his excisions on the whole will be understood from the following calculation :

In the Teubner edition the *Oeconomicus* occupies 71 pages, containing in all 2205 lines, more or less. Herr Lincke has printed a text with these omissions :

cc.	III	1—vi	11	396	lines
	VIII	3—8		31	"
	XI	12—13		13	"
	XI	24		5	"
	XIV	4—7		18	"
	XV	4—9		26	"
	XX	6—9		16	"
	XXI			73	"
				<hr/>	
				578	

in all 578 lines out of 2205, or nearly a quarter of the whole.

¹ Xenophons Dialog *περί οἰκονομίας* in seiner ursprünglichen Gestalt. Text und Abhandlungen von KARL LINCKE, Dr. Phil. Jena. 1879.

This is the treatise of which a critic so fastidious as Cobet (Nov. Lect., p. 568) can write, "venio nunc ad Xenophontis libellum quo non est alius ab eo nitidius venustiusque scriptus et magis expolitus et limatus," and of which George Long, the writer of the article in Smith's Dictionary, who would look at the matter from a point of view different from Cobet's, says "this is one of the best treatises of Xenophon," and which Grote can analyse without the slightest intimation that he finds it other than coherent and satisfactory. It happens, moreover, that we have unusually early evidence of the existence of our treatise in its traditional form. Cicero (de Off. II, § 87) speaks with admiration of the *Oeconomicus*, and says that in his youth he translated it into Latin. Parts of the suspected sections are quoted in the *Cato Major*: Columella quotes several other passages of Cicero's translation, some of them from the incriminated sections.

But it is not necessary to go into further detail to establish the unbroken tradition which defends the integrity of the treatise as we have it; for Herr Lincke himself admits that there is no evidence whatever of the existence at any time of a different edition of the work, and that it is certain that it must have been published before the expedition of Alexander the Great (334). Now, Xenophon died probably not earlier than 355; and we, therefore, have a period of less than twenty years within which the spurious passages, if there are such, must have been inserted. But the extreme improbability of a work's being tampered with so shortly after its publication, and the absolute want of evidence that the *Oeconomicus* ever existed as a published work in any other shape than that which it possessed till Herr Lincke took it to pieces, constrain him to adopt the theory that it was never published by Xenophon himself, but was found among his papers by the person into whose hands they came, and was given to the public after his death. Herr Lincke considers himself to have proved that this person was a mere beginner, as destitute of style as he was of practice, while even the chapters and sections added to this work show him to have improved as he went on. Still, notwithstanding the evident deficiencies which demonstrate that the interpolator belonged to a younger generation, his language betrays a near connexion with that of Xenophon himself, especially in those points which discriminate Xenophon's own style from that of the Attic classics. No teacher in Athens could have imparted such peculiarities. Nothing short of the influence of Xenophon's own individuality

could have produced such striking similarity in matter and manner. This exceeding similarity has indeed hitherto imposed upon all editors and interpreters; and we can explain it, as well as the author's familiarity with the Cyropaedia and his effort to work in Xenophon's own lines, only by the assumption that he was of kin to Xenophon, and received his earliest instruction from him. Since, further, there is no doubt that this young writer had in his possession several of Xenophon's works and undertook the editorial care of their publication, we may assert with considerable confidence that, as Xenophon's kinsman, he inherited his literary remains. The existence of such a kinsman is not left wholly to conjecture. There is a statement in Diogenes Laertius and another in Photius from which, it is said, it may be inferred that Xenophon's son Gryllus, who was killed before Mantinea, had a son named Xenophon after his grandfather. Diogenes Laertius speaks of a statement made by Deinarchus ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα ἀποστάσιον; and Photius mentions a Xenophon, son of Gryllus, along with Theopompus and Ephorus, as among the pupils of Isocrates, by whom they were incited to the pursuit of historical study. Herr Lincke thinks the latter statement of importance as containing an intimation of the literary activity of the *younger* Xenophon.

Such is Herr Lincke's theory, in deference to which he has subjected the Oeconomicus to the treatment I have described. It will, I think, be admitted that this is a case, if ever there was one, in which the burden of proof rests upon the assailant. To one who desires to defend the integrity of the suspected passages no other course is open, or is needed, than to state with all possible fairness the arguments alleged against them, and in this way to leave the unprejudiced reader, to whom Herr Lincke constantly appeals, to decide for himself whether they are strong enough to support the conclusion built upon them.

Of the 114 pages devoted by Herr Lincke to his argument, 88 are taken up with criticism of the matter of the incriminated passages, which he endeavors to show are clumsy *emblemata*, foisted into the tissue of the dialogue, marring its symmetry, and standing in no organic relation to the genuine parts; the remaining 26 pages contain what he has to say as to the style and phraseology of the interpolator. It will be impossible for me, within the limits at my disposal, to touch upon more than the most important of these criticisms.

The dialogue in its traditional shape is divided by Herr Lincke into three portions. The first of these, cc. 1 and 2, contains the introduction. In c. 1 Critobulus and Socrates discuss the meaning of *οἰκονομία*, whether there can be said to be such a science, and what is its subject matter. No possession is of any value unless the owner knows how to use it for his advantage; but with this knowledge even enemies may be turned to profit. Unbridled passions, however, reduce a man to a state of slavery, in which no wealth and no knowledge of its advantageous use will be of any service. In c. 2 Critobulus asserts his own freedom from this degrading condition, but desires to learn what course of action will conduce to the augmentation of his property. He expresses the suspicion that Socrates may think him sufficiently rich already. To his surprise, however, Socrates tells him that while he considers himself to be rich enough, though his whole property would be dear at five minae, he regards Critobulus as poor, though his estate would bring at least a hundred times as much. He calls Critobulus' attention to the many expenses his position as a rich man entails upon him. If Socrates should himself come to want, his friends would, with a trifling contribution, set him on his legs again with what would be for him an abundance. But Critobulus' friends are always looking for favors from him. So that Socrates feels a real concern for Critobulus, *μή τι ἀνήκεστον κακὸν πάθῃ καὶ εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν καταστῇ*. This leads Critobulus to entreat Socrates to act as his guide to the acquisition of wealth. Socrates points out that this request seems an absurd one for Critobulus to make, who had but now laughed at him for his ignorance in representing himself as rich while the wealthy Critobulus was poor. But Critobulus retorts that Socrates knows at least one *πλουτηρὸν ἔργον*, viz. *περιουσίαν ποιεῖν*. If he is able so to husband his little as to have more than he wants, he must surely be able to make a larger store yield a more ample abundance. Socrates, after protesting that he has had no property of his own to handle with a view to increase, and has never had that of any other persons intrusted to him to make experiments with, says that the case is not yet hopeless for Critobulus; for he will indicate to Critobulus others far more capable than himself to give instruction in what he is so anxious to learn from him: *ἐγὼ τοίνυν σοι δεῖξω ὅσα νῦν λιπαρεῖς παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνειν πολλὸν ἄλλους ἐμοῦ δεινότερους περὶ ταῦτα*. Socrates has, he confesses, had his attention strongly attracted by the fact that men who are engaged in the same lines of work pursue them with very different

results, some acquiring wealth and others falling into distress. On examining the cause of this surprising fact he was led to see that it came about quite naturally, *πάνυ οἰκείως*, and his observation had thus made him acquainted with the most conspicuous instances of successful enterprise in various departments to be found in the city: *ὁμολογῶ μεμεληχέναι μοι οὔτινες ἕκαστα ἐπιστημονέστατοί εἰσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει*. From these Socrates is sure that Critobulus might learn to become an able money-getter: *παρ' ὧν ἂν καὶ σὲ οἴμαι, εἰ βούλοιο, μαθόντα, πάνυ ἂν δεινὸν χρηματιστὴν γενέσθαι*.

These words conclude the second chapter; I have quoted two or three lines of the Greek that it may be seen what it is Socrates undertakes to do. He has no practical knowledge of economical matters himself. He has, it is true, had his attention attracted by the variety in the fortunes of men engaged in the same enterprises; and the observation he has made has taught him in general that attention and care were rewarded by success and that negligent dealing brought its natural punishment with it, and has besides made him acquainted with the most successful practitioners in various walks of life. He offers to indicate these persons to Critobulus, whose wants would thus be supplied better than they could be supplied by Socrates himself. He does not undertake to give instruction himself, either immediately or mediately. The first three lines of c. 3, which Herr Lincke supposes to be genuine, are *Ἀκούσας ταῦτα ὁ Κριτόβουλος εἶπε, Νῦν τοι, ἔφη, ἐγὼ σε οὐδέτι ἀφήσω, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὶν ἂν μοι ἃ ὑπέσχησαι ἐναντίον τῶν φίλων τουτωνῶν ἀποδείξῃς*. In view of all that has preceded, these words can mean nothing else than that Critobulus insists that their present group shall not break up till Socrates has indicated the persons to whom Critobulus should apply for instruction. There is not, so far as I can see, a syllable which could justify Critobulus in calling for or expecting the performance of Socrates' promise in any other sense.

When we again come upon the genuine dialogue, according to Herr Lincke's text (c. 6, § 12 of the ordinary one), we find Socrates saying: *τί οὖν, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ἦν σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς διηγήσονται ὥς συνεχρόμην ποτὲ ἀνδρὶ θς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει εἶναι τῷ ὄντι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐφ' οἷς τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα δικαίως ἔσθιν ὃ καλεῖται καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ*. Critobulus assents, and then we hear no more of him, the rest of the book being taken up with a report by Socrates of a conversation he had once had with a certain Ischomachus. Herr Lincke's account (p. 52) of c. 3, 1, following on Critobulus' demand for

immediate satisfaction is this, "und dieser beginnt denn . . . den belerenden Vortrag." And below he says that the second chapter contains the proof (1) that Critobulus needs instruction in good husbandry, and (2) "*auf welche Weise* Socrates ihm die Belerung werde erteilen können." I think that these expressions indicate the fundamental mistake made by Herr Lincke. There is not, as I have said, a syllable that implies a promise on the part of Socrates to communicate instruction either derived from his own experience or imparted to him by others. All that Socrates undertakes to do is to indicate persons among the citizens who, he is assured by his observation of their success, must be able to teach others to follow their example. Herr Lincke supposes that the report of the long conversation with Ischomachus is the fulfilment of Socrates' promise, and is therefore naturally surprised that between Critobulus' demand for the immediate performance of it and the discourse which he assumes to be its fulfilment, Socrates should coolly, and without any protest on the part of Critobulus, intercalate a long discussion about various points of good husbandry amounting to three chapters and a half. Herr Lincke repeats again (p. 54) his summary of the introduction, "lässt sich *das Versprechen des Socrates* etwa so formuliren: Socrates, dem die eigne Erfahrung in der Erwerbskunde abgeht, erklärt sich *zum Ersatz dafür* und unter Zustimmung des Kritobulos bereit, *ihm die nötige Belerung durch Schilderung musterhafter Männer aus Athen zu erteilen.*" I maintain on the contrary that there is not a word to show that Socrates promised to do anything else for Critobulus than to indicate to him citizens from whom he could learn if he chose. In c. 3, § 1 foll. (of the received text), Socrates says he can point out persons who spend much money on building their houses and yet find them inconvenient, while others with a much smaller outlay have houses with every needful convenience. Some again he can indicate whose possessions are practically of no use to them from the disorderly way in which they are kept, while others have the full advantage of everything they possess, because they can lay their hands on them when they want them. Again men differ in a corresponding way in the handling of their slaves, in the management of their farms, of their horses, of their wives. As Socrates goes over these six points he is made to use such phrases as ἐγὼ σε ἄξω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις, σὺ δὲ θεώμενος δῆπου καταμαθήσει. Of course, as Herr Lincke denies the genuineness of these sections, I cannot refer to these expressions as evidence of Xenophon's own statement

of his purpose. But it must be admitted that the interpolator would have understood the first two chapters as well as Herr Lincke, and he could not have intended in his additions to represent the promise of Socrates as different from what it was stated to be in the second chapter. Herr Lincke, on the contrary, interpreting Socrates' intention as I have described, finds in this enumeration of six points of good and bad husbandry a complete abandonment by Socrates of his professed purpose.

At the end of c. 3 Socrates says that he can, if Critobulus pleases, indicate to him successful practitioners of other branches (*τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν*). But, c. 4, 1, Critobulus says that it would be useless to point out to him the means of acquiring all; he merely desires that Socrates will indicate the best and the most suitable for *him*, and do what he can to help him by teaching him himself. Socrates then goes on to exclude from consideration the mechanical trades (*αἱ βαναυσικαί*), and when Critobulus asks him *ἡμῖν δὲ ποίαις συμβουλεύεις χρῆσθαι*, replies that they need not be ashamed to imitate the Persian king who is said to set the highest value on the arts of war and of agriculture. And the remainder of the fourth chapter is taken up with an account of the system by which the Persian arrangements conduce to the highest cultivation of the soil; and we have the story of the visit of Lysander to Cyrus the younger and the account of the prince's personal labors in his garden, which is translated by Cicero in his *Cato Major* (c. 17). At the beginning of c. 5, Socrates tells Critobulus that the reason of his narrating this story is that he might prove *ὅτι τῆς γεωργίας οὐδ' οἱ πάντοτε μακάριοι δύνανται ἀπέχσθαι*. And he then proceeds to enumerate many of the advantages of an agricultural life, at the end of c. 5 insisting that it is as necessary to secure the favor of the gods for success in the cultivation of the ground as it is in warlike enterprises. In c. 6, Critobulus assents to this, but begs Socrates to return from his digression and pursue the subject of economy proper, as he thinks he has a clearer view now of the proper mode of life. Socrates then proposes that they should first review what they had so far agreed to, and this leads us to c. 6, § 12, where Herr Lincke allows that the genuine dialogue is continued. I shall give as briefly as I can the chief points of his criticism on these chapters, premising that I shall omit nothing which seems to me of greater weight than what I cite.

Herr Lincke objects (p. 57) that in these chapters we have an independent statement of Socrates' own views on various points of

good management and the most important occupations, notwithstanding his former refusal to give any instruction himself on the ground of ignorance of the subject (p. 57). "Ist es nicht unge-reimt, dass er trotz dieser Weigerung weiter docirt? Wie lächerlich ist die gedankenlose Anmasung, dass er unmittelbar nach seinem Geständnis über seine Unerfahrenheit in der Oekonomik nichts des-toweniger seine eigne Meinung über wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten an den Mann zu bringen sucht." On his remarks on the proper age for buying horses and their management, we are asked, "klingt das nicht wie Sachkenntnis und eigne Erfahrung?" I need make no remarks on Herr Lincke's apparent incapacity to appreciate the irony of Socrates.

Then he finds a similar contradiction (p. 58) in the allusion to the Persian king. Was it not the ἐπιστημονέστατοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει from whom he has said that Critobulus could learn? After this, when Socrates says (4, 4) ἄρα μὴ αἰσχυνοῦμεν τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα μιμήσασθαι, "diese Worte müssen jeden, der auf den Zusammenhang achtet, in gerechtes Erstaunen versetzen." If the author intended to make this reference to the Persian king, and to pronounce a panegyric on his arrangements, why did he direct attention so pointedly to Athenians? It is strange that Herr Lincke has not noticed here that the mention of the Persian king's attention to agriculture is introduced merely to show Critobulus that such attention is respectable: to prove that τῆς γεωργίας οὐδ' οἱ πάνυ μακάριοι δύνανται ἀπέχεσθαι (c. 5, 1). Whatever may be thought of some of the details of this episode, it is not in the smallest degree inconsistent with anything that has preceded it. It is impossible for me to follow in detail all that Herr Lincke alleges as to the want of coherence between what he assumes to have been Socrates' promise and the actual contents of these chapters. He uses the strongest expressions to do justice to his sense of incongruity: "passt-wie die Faust aufs Auge" (p. 60): "so besteht denn in allem was die Form der Darstellung betrifft ein tiefgehender, schroffer Widerspruch zwischen der Erklärung die Socrates in der Einleitung gegeben hat und der hierauf unternommenen Behandlung des Themas" (p. 62). Socrates has taken the liberty of putting forward his own knowledge and to support it with unsuitable examples. Still we can see that the author of the interpolation has tried to disguise his handi-work by using expressions which may have the appearance "als stehe alles in gutem Zusammenhang." Herr Lincke then proceeds at great length to show how unsuited the doctrine expressed by

Socrates in these chapters is to the needs of Critobulus. We have been told in the first and second chapters that Critobulus needs instruction as to the use of his property so as to increase it: only to him who knows how to use his goods are they really χρήματα. But he is a householder. We learn from 1, 8-13, and also from 2, 11, that horses, land, sheep and money are the objects from which gain is made. "Auf Landbau, Viehzucht, Capitalanlage und ähnliche Dinge hat sich also die Belerung im gegebenen Falle zu richten—*aber auch zu beschränken*" (p. 63). We cannot, therefore, be surprised that Herr Lincke thinks that the description of the mixed agricultural and military arrangements of the Persians can have no instructive interest for Critobulus; therefore "es fehlt dem ganzen Abschnitt die organische Bestimmung" (p. 67). Wholly inappropriate and useless is the reference to Cyrus the younger and the account of Lysander's visit to him. Critobulus can derive not the slightest benefit from this. It was of no use to hold up before him the example of Cyrus' personal labors in his garden, for he needs no such stimulus. His disposition has been already shown to be excellent. "Alles dies zeigt uns nicht Socrates als Lerer der Erwerbskunde, sondern ein Wirrkopf, der nicht weis was er seinem Zuhörer schuldig ist" (p. 69). Again, in regard to the details of the panegyric on agriculture in c. 5, Herr Lincke finds himself equally dissatisfied. In § 1 Socrates attributes to the exercise of it ἡδυστάθειά τις καὶ ὀλίγου ἀξίησις καὶ σωματίων ἄσχησις. But this order of treatment is not followed in the chapter; and besides other matters are intruded, as in § 3 the mention of the supply of material for sacrifice to the gods. "Es liegt auf der Hand, dass die Gaben des Landes, welche zu Opfern verwendet werden, nicht als Gegenstände des Genusses oder des Gewinnes für den Menschen aufzufassen sind" (p. 71). After pointing out more of such infelicities, he concludes: "das Ganze macht überhaupt von Anfang bis zu Ende den Eindruck einer Reihe schlecht geordneter und nicht immer treffender Einfälle" (p. 72). It is, he thinks, a prime fault of all this discourse that it contains no practical suggestions. The remarks of Socrates seem not to be addressed to Critobulus, who can derive no benefit from the bare assertion that agriculture procures much pleasure and profit: "es hat vielmehr den Anschein, als sei die Absicht einem unerfahrenen jungen Manne, der nicht recht weis welche Beschäftigung er wol am besten ergreifen soll, Interesse für die Landwirthschaft einzuflösen" (p. 73). Herr Lincke here expresses, in my judgment, the exact truth; but whereas he con-

siders that a discourse of this character is self-condemned where it stands, with my view of the circumstances of the case it needs no justification.

Herr Lincke then has some remarks upon the recapitulation at the beginning of c. 6. It is not, I confess, as complete as one might expect, and it mentions one conclusion as having been reached which is not found in the previous chapters. But this difficulty has troubled all the commentators, who make various attempts to set matters straight. It is not, therefore, worth while to follow Herr Lincke in his discussion of the shortcomings of this passage, as he only differs from others in the greater minuteness of his examination and in the violence of his remedy. It is indeed remarkable that Herr Lincke in all his criticism, both of the ill-adjustment of the parts of the dialogue to each other and of shortcomings in regard to phraseology and syntax, appears never to think that a lighter remedy than total expulsion of the offending passage might be resorted to.

I must pass lightly over the rest of Herr Lincke's remarks on these chapters. As he has complained of their want of proper subordination to the beginning of the dialogue as he understands it, so he takes further offence at the fact that in some respects they anticipate the discourse of Ischomachus, which forms the latter portion of it. He thinks that no one can believe that Socrates would have delivered this pitiful cento of remarks while he had firm in his recollection the original and well ordered utterance of Ischomachus and intended presently to repeat it in full. But surely it is a perfectly natural supposition to imagine that Socrates may have had at first no intention of recounting his conversation with Ischomachus, and may have been led on by the interest of Critobulus to do more than he purposed. I do not think it is at all necessary to make this supposition; I only suggest it to call attention to the flimsy character of Herr Lincke's reasoning. Herr Lincke attacks particularly the remarks introduced about the Persian king. There is indeed in this passage one fault which it is quite impossible that Xenophon can have committed. After his speaking of Cyrus the elder, certain remarks are introduced about the younger Cyrus without any indication that the persons were different. This difficulty has, however, engaged the attention of the commentators before, and been variously dealt with. Schenkl thinks that two sections (18 and 19) are an interpolation (which they are exceedingly likely to be, as they contain two quotations with almost verbal

exactness from the Anabasis), and that when these crept into the text the context was mutilated and altered to suit them. But beyond this Herr Lincke thinks that Xenophon could never have represented Socrates, whom he must have heard discourse before he joined Cyrus' expedition in 401, as possessed of a knowledge of Persian customs which he himself only acquired during the Cyreian expedition; and he could not but feel how inadequate a guarantee for affairs in Persia Socrates must have seemed, who had hardly ever passed beyond the limits of his own country. But, says Herr Lincke, even granting that Xenophon might possibly have committed this absurdity of making Socrates pose as an authority on Persian matters, he certainly would not have represented him as uttering what was false and perverse. The ground of this attack is that in speaking of the officers in charge of the various duties of raising and dispensing the revenues, of controlling the troops, etc., the word *οἱ ἄρχοντες* is not used in one exclusive meaning. It is true that Cobet (N. L. p. 574) has bracketed this word twice, but merely, as he says, because "sententiam onerat." Herr Lincke finds it intolerable that it should not have been used as the technical name of one grade of officers. He is also offended that Socrates is made to say that when these officers are found inefficient the king *παύων τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλους ἐπιμελητάς καθίστησι*, because in Cyr. VIII 1, 9, Xenophon "die ἐπιμεληταί als untergeordnete Beamte genannt und ihre Functionen definiert hat" (p. 90). It is worth while to quote this passage from the Cyropaedia that we may see with what degree of precise definition of rank the word is used there. *Κῦρος δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τὰλλα καθίστη ἄλλους ἐπιμελητάς, καὶ ἦσαν αὐτῷ καὶ προσόδων ἀποδεκτῆρες καὶ δαπανημάτων δοτῆρες καὶ ἔργων ἐπιστάται καὶ πτημάτων φύλακες καὶ τῶν εἰς τὴν δῖαιταν ἐπιτηδείων ἐπιμεληταί· καὶ ἵππων δὲ καὶ κυνῶν ἐπιμελητάς καθίστη οὓς ἐνόμιζε καὶ ταῦτα τὰ βροσκήματα βέλτιστ' ἂν παρέχειν αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι.* I think that no one, who had not a case to make out, would imagine that in these passages the words *ἄρχοντες* and *ἐπιμεληταί* were used in a technical sense at all. Herr Lincke himself refers to two passages in the Cyropaedia (VIII 1, 6; 6, 14) in which the term *ἄρχοντες* is used for *σατράπαι*, but only for the more certain establishment of his thesis here: for it seems he has in another treatise proved that these passages are also interpolations, the work, as he believes, of the same unprincipled grandson. He does not find it possible to describe, except in general terms, the motives which can have influenced this misguided youth thus to disfigure with his senseless

and clumsy interpolations the well adjusted scheme of Xenophon. He can say no more than that he "den Inhalt des Gespräches durch allerlei Notizen zu bereichern und durch dialogisch-rhetorische Redeübungen zu verschönern gesucht hat" (p. 92). Xenophon, it seems, had had some influence over the young man's style. We can only regret that the moral training which, no doubt, he received had an effect on his subsequent conduct so much more feeble than could be desired.

I shall pass over without special remark the shorter interpolations which follow, which betray, according to Herr Lincke, either contradictions of what we find in the genuine book, or senseless repetitions for which the interpolator betrays "ebensoviel Vorliebe als Ungeschick" (p. 97). I must, however, say something about the last chapter (21), which is expunged entirely. The contents of this chapter are as follows: Socrates congratulates Ischomachus on his successful vindication of the merits of agriculture as a pursuit, *ὡς εἶ τῇ ὑποθέσει ὅλον τὸν λόγον βοηθοῦντα παρέσχησαι*. Ischomachus replies that in every sort of activity the quality of aptness for command, *τὸ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι*, is that which most discriminates one man from another; and he illustrates this position by the different behavior and different influence of shipmasters and generals, as they are or are not fit for command. To the whole of this chapter, as well as to its details, Herr Lincke has serious objections to make. It has clearly undergone some hard usage at the hands of transcribers. This may be indicated by the fact that one passage is, as it stands, unintelligible, and that Cobet has made some ten suggestions of emendation in it. I shall confine myself, therefore, to Herr Lincke's objections to the matter of the chapter. He thinks the illustrations taken from commanders on land and at sea flat and trivial, and is sure that the interpolator borrowed from the Cyropaedia. He can see no point in the remark that the well-managed crew come ashore reeking with sweat while the others land *ἀνιδρωπί*, because the sweat could be no advantage to the former nor the want of it punishment to the latter (p. 128). He cannot understand any reason why the lazy crew should hate the commander who has not succeeded in making them work. The disparagement of personal advantages and of distinguished excellence in military exercises, in comparison with the capacity to inspire courage and a spirit of obedience, appears to him "völlig sinnlos." He points to Anab. I 9, 5, where we are told that Cyrus the younger excelled in horsemanship and the use of arms; but he does not

refer to An. II 6, in which the merits of Clearchus as a commander are depicted, especially his ability *ἐμποιῆσαι τοῖς παροῦσιν ὡς πιστέον ἐῖη Κλεάρχῳ*, but not a word is said of his superiority in military exercises. All this shows, Herr Lincke thinks, that the author of the chapter was entirely destitute of warlike experience. "Der Verfasser war offenbar ohne militärisches Verständnis und kriegsische Erfahrung" (p. 128). He cannot understand how it can be possible that a master should be armed with full power of reward and punishment, and yet fail in making his dependents eager to do their best under his eye. What more can a master have? he asks. It is inconceivable that Ischomachus can have indicated an opposition between one governor so equipped with full powers and another who is able to inspire his subordinates with a desire to do their duty. "Mir scheint diese Annahme rein aus der Luft gegriffen und das durch den Gegensatz bezeichnete Verhältnis praktisch undenkbar" (p. 129). He thinks, moreover, that for Ischomachus, after he has in the genuine part of the dialogue described the way in which he himself secured obedience and hearty work from his people, to say here that the possession of such a power is *ἐχέειν τι ἥθους βασιλικοῦ* would be "ein hässliches Selbstlob" (p. 126). And in general he finds the praise of this quality of capacity for rule altogether excessive. It was only *one* of the five qualities mentioned in cc. 12-15 as needed in the *ἐπίτροπος*, and why should it be here singled out and exalted above the knowledge of what has to be done, which is really the principal thing in agriculture as in everything else? Ischomachus has told us himself (13, 2) that a steward ignorant of what needed to be done would be as useless as a physician who should be regular in visiting his patients but should be unable to prescribe for them. Is it then conceivable that he should here at the end of the dialogue insist so strongly on the possession of a capacity for command? "Es ist kein passendes Schlusswort, sondern ein unnützes Anhängsel" (p. 125)? Now, in all this, which Herr Lincke thinks so foreign to what we might expect, Grote (Plato III, p. 571) finds the most characteristic traces of Xenophon's handiwork; and goes on to show how Xenophon's own experience must have turned his attention peculiarly to the difficulty of ensuring steady obedience from subordinates, and to the conditions by which such difficulty might be overcome. We see, therefore, that the very remarks which seem to Herr Lincke to betray a writer wholly without military experience, appear to Grote as the ripest fruit of lifelong observation of the conditions of success in the most important affairs.

The resource which a defender of the genuineness of the attacked passages would naturally resort to, of quoting expressions of similar sentiment from Xenophon's other writings, is in the present case hardly available. For it either turns out that Herr Lincke himself, or some one else working on the same critical lines, has proved the spuriousness of the passages one desires to cite; or that these passages are referred to as evidently the ones which the interpolator of the *Oeconomicus* had under his eye when he perpetrated his forgeries. Thus Herr Lincke discredits this 21st chapter on the ground that it is borrowed from the *Cyropaedia* (I 6, 20, 21; III 1, 20, 28; I 1, 6). It is indeed true that precisely the same sentiments are there expressed in different language. But if the passage in the *Oeconomicus* is to be discredited on this account, so must also considerable portions of *Anab.* I 9, be expunged for the same reason. To illustrate the minuteness of Herr Lincke's comparative method: he finds that the mention by Ischomachus (c. 9, 6), in his instruction to his wife as to the advantages of order and putting everything in its own place, of *ὑποδήματα γυναικεῖα, ὑποδήματα ἀνδρεῖα* was in the eye of the interpolator of *Cyr.* VIII 2, 5, where, among other instances of the division of labor in a great city we are told, *ἀλλ' ὑποδήματα ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀνδρεῖα ὁ δὲ γυναικεῖα*. The advice of Ischomachus to his wife to abstain from the use of rouge and other means of making herself appear handsomer than nature had made her has, it seems, been utilized by the interpolator of *Cyr.* VIII 1, 40, in which we are told that Cyrus thought it worth while for himself and his great officers to impose by such artifices on the minds of the lower orders. On the other hand the illustration of the advantages and the beauty of good order from the movements of a chorus is genuine in the *Cyropaedia* (I 6, 18), and borrowed from it by the interpolator of the *Oeconomicus* (c. 8, 3).

I have now given, as I think, a fair account of Herr Lincke's arguments against the genuineness of portions of the *Oeconomicus*, so far as they are grounded on matter and arrangement. I now proceed to consider as briefly as I can his objections to the style and diction of the incriminated passages. Here again the natural mode of defending them is forestalled by Herr Lincke, who says that, inasmuch as it has been proved that the interpolator was a younger contemporary of Xenophon, and must have been in the most intimate relations with him, and have taken great pains to imitate him, it cannot surprise us to find a certain similarity between his diction and that of the genuine Xenophon. And he then proceeds

to enumerate some seventy-five words or expressions which are notably Xenophontian; and then he gives a shorter list of points of agreement, not with Xenophon himself, but with the Attic usage of the period. But the inference which an unwary reader might be disposed to draw from this similarity is rudely checked by the statement that in the interpolated passages altogether there are no less than fifty-seven words not elsewhere found in Xenophon. This seems at first sight a formidable fact; but the force of it is at once reduced by Herr Lincke himself who says, (*a*) that several of them are unobjectionable as being evidently the words required by the passages in which they occur; (*b*) that others are clearly formed on the analogy of Xenophontian words; (*c*) others are due to the subject of the digressions in which they occur, as *χωμφόδος*, *τραγφόδος*, *κύκλιος χορός*, *ἐμπλεῖν*, etc. But making all allowance for these deductions, the interpolator betrays a want of restraint which a good writer would not exhibit. In his criticism here Herr Lincke does not seem to recognize as one of the characteristics of Xenophon's diction a fondness for poetic and epic expressions, a remark which Cobet makes more than once. I just mention in the order in which they come a few of the words to which exception is taken: *ἀτερπής* (Thucyd.), *εὐμάρεια* (poet. and Plat.), *σχιατραφεῖσθαι* (Hdt. and Plat.), *χαλοποιεῖν*, which occurs in Aesch., Aristoph., and also, I was going to say, in Xen. Mem. III 5, 26; but my petty triumph is at once wrested from me by the observation that Herr Lincke has himself noted this fact, but concludes that "es ist nur ein Beweis mer für die Unechtheit dieser Stelle"—*i. e.* of the Memorabilia (p. 143). The interpolator is inordinately fond of using compounds where a practised writer would have contented himself with the simple word, *e. g.* *ἀποιεῖν πρόσω*, which Eurip. has, and Thucyd. with *μακράν*: *καταπλουτίζειν*, *κατακερδαίνειν* (which last Cobet expressly justifies, N. L. p. 574, as here required by the meaning), and others of the same character. He thinks that in hardly one is the preposition of any perceptible use, and is convinced that the employment of them is due merely to the desire to give an appearance of strength to the style. I have myself gone over with some care the genuine parts of the dialogue to see if they did not betray analogous phenomena with the interpolated ones. My conclusion is that on this ground there is no sort of reason for attributing them to a different author. I will only mention one or two points. In c. 9, 3, Ischomachus, speaking of the designed adaptation of various apartments in his house to the things they were to be

occupied by, uses the expression ὥστε αὐτὰ ἐκάλει τὰ πρέποντα ἐνὶ ἐκάστω, and in the next paragraph he uses παρακαλεῖν in the same connection. The word χερσεύειν is used in c. 5, 17 (spurious), in the sense of 'to lie barren or waste.' And it appears to be used only by Xenophon and only in this book. Why then has not Herr Lincke mentioned it among his notes of forgery? I suggest that the reason may be that it occurs again in the same sense in the genuine chapter 16, 5.

After his criticism of the diction, Herr Lincke passes to the grammar. In no case, so far as I have observed, does he give the unfortunate writer the benefit of the supposition that he may have been misreported by his transcribers. It is just to these matters that Cobet has devoted thirty-three pages of his *Novae Lectiones*, his suggestions being distributed impartially over the genuine as well as the spurious portions. To take a single instance: we find in 21, 8, μέγας τῷ ὄντι οὗτος ἀνὴρ, ὅς ἄν—δύνηται, on which Herr Lincke notes the omission of the article with ἀνὴρ. But Cobet remarks, "loci artificiose compositi concinnitas postulat ut scribatur μέγας τῷ ὄντι οὗτος ἄν εἴη ὅς ἄν χ. τ. λ." Many of Herr Lincke's defects have been eliminated from the text by emendations as certain as this. Of others it may be said that, supposing them to be errors, they would have been as impossible to the assumed fabricator as to Xenophon himself, or as it would be to a well-educated American youth to write 'I was going to home,' unless he purposely violated what his ear must have told him was the correct rule. As a single instance: he points to ἐν τῷ ἄστυ in the spurious 5, 4, whereas in the genuine 11, 18 we have the normal εἰς ἄστυ without the article. Now, the use of ἄστυ without the article was either established or it was not. If the expressed article was so rigorously forbidden by usage that the use of it, as in the above passage, could not be defended by the immediately preceding and contrasted ἐν τῷ χώρῳ, then this usage must have been as much a matter of instinct with the supposed Xenophon the younger as it was with his grandfather, and the insertion of the article must be due to the ignorance of a copyist. Again Herr Lincke refers to the use of σύν and μετά. I am not sure that I quite understand him here. He finds in certain spurious sections the use of σύν to μετά as 5 : 2. But T. Mommsen has established that the ratio was as 2 : 1. We must therefore conclude that we have here a suspicious approximation to poetical language and not a correspondence with the usage of Xenophon. All such reasoning seems to me to the last degree hazardous. He

complains further that we find in 21, 7, ἐμποιῆσαι τοῖς στρατιώταις ἀκολουθητέον εἶναι instead of, as in Anab. II 6, 8, ὡς πειστέον εἶη, remarking that it was only by a degradation of meaning, similar to that of *efficere* from Cicero on, that ἐμποιεῖν could be used with the infinitive. This he thinks was not possible for Xenophon. But we find in 15, 1, which is genuine, ἐπειδὴν ἐμποιήσης τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. As this stands in Lincke's text I can see no difference between it and the assailed construction of 21. It is true that here Schenkl, after Heindorf, inserts τὸ before ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; but this is apparently only to restore symmetry with a preceding clause, and not from any doubt as to the construction.

It is impossible in the great number of similar observations that Herr Lincke adduces to do more than pick out one here and there. His opinion is that the interpolator improved as he went on: "übrigens ist das 5te Capitel schon besser geschrieben als das 4te." But if one may form a judgment from the number of emendations Cobet has found desirable, the last chapter is the worst in the book.

As I have not wittingly left unmentioned any criticism of greater weight than those I have adduced, I think it must be admitted that the case made out by Herr Lincke is not a strong one. I recognize to the fullest extent the learning he has displayed and feel that the labor he has expended, if it had a more hopeful object, would deserve all praise. But I must be allowed to say that I consider we have in Herr Lincke's book a good specimen, only slightly exaggerated, of the kind of work on which an undue portion of German energy and German learning is expended. There seems to exist there a perfect mania for *athetesis*. Whether the existence of it is due in any degree to the demand for novelty in the subjects chosen for doctoral dissertations, I will not take upon me to decide. But it has, I think, certainly reached the proportions of a plague, and one which grows by what it feeds on. On this point Cobet remarks (Mnem. VII, p. 263), "ubi semel huiusmodi opinio (de falsitate librorum) subiit animum et quis suspiciosius tentat omnia an forte vitium sonent, facile reperiuntur quae eam suspicionem alant et confirment, unde tandem exoritur τὸ ἀδαμαντίνως πεπεῖσθαι, quod mentis aciem praestringit et occaecat." Herr Lincke believes that not the *Oeconomicus* alone, but also the *Memorabilia*, the *de venatione*, and in all probability the *Cyropaedia* were published not by Xenophon himself but by the heir who took charge of his literary remains; and he tells us it yet remains a task for criticism to undertake to ascertain, from the interpolations

which have been or are to be detected in these works and which all are doubtless of the same paternity, what was the literary capacity of the editor. This disease is unfortunately not confined to the Germans. It is sometimes taken in a virulent form by foreign students who are subjected to the same influence. I find, for instance, in a doctoral dissertation of a learned young American, which treats another famous author in a way analogous to Herr Lincke's dealing with the *Oeconomicus*, a protest against the *socordia* of the poor creature who maintains that what has hitherto passed as the genuine work of an author must be regarded as genuine till it has been proved to be spurious; and he then announces this statement: "gravior est eius culpa qui poetae famam obscurat unum spurium verum defendens quam eius qui illum duobus bonis et genuinis privat." I confess this doctrine appears to me portentous.

How different is this rule of criticism from that which is recommended by the veteran August Boeckh. The pages in which he discusses the principles of the higher criticism; the jealousy with which he guards the rights of an author to his own work; the cautious discrimination which he insists upon as the first duty of a scholar who undertakes to question the genuineness of a book or a passage, seem to me to embody a doctrine as unlike as possible to that I have just quoted; and the concluding words of one of his chapters appear to recommend the very opposite spirit in approaching such questions. "Wir müssen immer von der Tradition ausgehen und versuchen, ob sich die unverdächtigen positiven Zeugnisse für den Ursprung einer Schrift durch combinatorische Kritik bestätigen und vervollständigen lassen. Wo das Urtheil irgend wie schwankend ist, gilt der Grundsatz: quivis praesumitur genuinus liber, donec demonstretur contrarium." Contrast these words with a dictum of the writer I have just quoted, "neque justus erga poetam est qui omnia genuina esse affirmat usquedum spuria demonstrantur." Can any two principles of procedure be more diametrically opposed to each other?

The genuineness of the 3d book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was also denied on similar grounds by Rose and others. On this proceeding L. Spengel remarks, "nam tertius liber, quem nostratum quidam et temere et inepte Aristotelis esse negant, si quis alius ingenuus philosophi nostri foetus est. V. Rose a discipulo tertium additum esse dicit, iam de universa hac rhetorica ab Aristotele profecta dubitat: haec est nostrae aetatis ars critica."

C. D. MORRIS.